Preliminary Observations on the MOU on the Ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel - What does it actually mean?
Legal Nature
This memorandum appears to be a non-binding agreement, unlike formal international treaties.
In other words, it is a text with a political-legal character but with limited binding effect.
Statement in the Preamble
The preamble states that “Lebanon and Israel are not in a state of war.”
Legally, this does not align with reality, as the 1949 Armistice Agreement is still in force. A state of war does not end simply by denying it, but through a peace treaty. A more accurate legal phrasing would be: “Lebanon and Israel are not in a state of armed conflict.”
This statement aims to:
Create a clear legal separation between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah, meaning that any conflict is not automatically considered a war between Lebanon and Israel.
Shield the state from the consequences of any conflict, especially given Israel’s commitment not to carry out offensive military operations against Lebanese targets, including civilian, military, or other state-related targets on Lebanese land, air, or sea (as stated in the 2nd sentence of Article 3).
Absence of References to Previous Frameworks
The memorandum makes no reference to prior texts such as the cessation of hostilities agreement (27/11/2024) or to relevant UN Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 1701.
This absence suggests an attempt to move away from previous obligations, especially those imposed on Israel, such as land withdrawal.
Lack of Monitoring Mechanism
The memorandum does not include any mechanism to oversee implementation or monitor violations.
This creates clear legal ambiguity and makes implementation dependent on political and field dynamics.
Article 1
The ceasefire is considered temporary for an initial period of 10 days, renewable by mutual agreement between Lebanon and Israel if progress is made in negotiations and if Lebanon demonstrates its ability to assert its sovereignty, as stated in Article 2.
This differs from what was stated in the 27/11/2024 agreement.
Article 3
Israel retains, with Lebanon’s approval, the right to pre-emptive self-defense (“freedom of action”) in a way that is not open to interpretation.
This type of defense does not align with international law, meaning the text gives Israel broader room to operate within Lebanon.
Article 4
For the first time, Hezbollah is described in a text approved by Lebanon as a “rogue non-state armed group”.
This is an unprecedented characterization and may have legal and political consequences, particularly at the international level.
Article 5
The memorandum affirms that sovereignty and defense are exclusively in the hands of the Lebanese state, and that no other party has the right to claim this role.
In practice, this removes any official Lebanese cover for Hezbollah and reinforces a complete separation between the group and the state.
